Moving electronic tokens or tickets over networks makes business processes more effective. At the same time, such a movement will sometimes produce disturbed results , such as illegal copies , unauthorized disclosures , and accidental destructions. Tarnper Resistance Network (TRN) is a secure distribution infrastructure networked among smartcards and other tamperproof devices. Over TRN, we can move tokens electronically, preventing from being duplicated or lost. In order to enhance the security of online token trading, the control of atomicity and the trace of the movement are discussed . In addition , we will present an initial experimentation, where electronic tickets are sold, exchanged, and examined over the prototyped TRN implementation.
INTRODUCTION
A token , or a ticket, is information with value. Information technology today opens up great possibilities for digitalizing tokens and its applications. In particular, a tamper-proof personal device such as a smartcard can protect data from illegal copies and unauthorized modification. Using such a device, we can secure the value of electronic tokens.
Furthermore, a token is essentially a moving object; many kinds of tickets allow a buyer to transfer a ticket to others. Even a nonnegotiable token such as an airline ticket could be distributed through an intermediary, like a travel agency. Accordingly, the transferability is very important for implementing electronic token applications. The objective of this study is to secure the transfer of tokens among tamper-proof devices.
The starting point of our approach is, say, a virtual private network among tamper-proof devices. An encrypted session directly opened between two devices 2 .
ELECTRONIC TRANSFERABLE TOKEN
Motivation
First of all, let us imagine a hard ticket to a popular event, such as the World Cup soccer and an Olympic game. Vacant seats are not desirable for both the organizer and people who want to attend the game. We consider that electronic transferable tickets will reduce unused tickets and vacant seats; for example, a person who suddenly cancels the game can send his or her ticket to a remote buyer. Also, a secondary marketplace that an authorized broker organizes will inject liquidity of tokens over the Internet.
The movement of tokens, however, results in heightened risks of destroying value, for example, illegal copies, unauthorized disclosures and accidental destructions. Thus, many ticketing systems restrict online transfer. The smartcardbased ticket is regarded as a semi-digitalized solution, where a ticket is exchanged physically although stored electronically. More recently, NTT's Digital Ticket system extends the trading of tickets on smartcard through trusted third parties. [12] However, the transfer through a mediator seems to be inefficient, too complex and less scalable. In addition, some people dislikes even trusted parties in terms of trading privacy.
Our fundamental approach to Tamper Resistance Network is based on two-party communication. A ticket wallet (depicted in the next section) directly sends an electronic token to another wallet. In this context, the TRN could be said to be a virtual private network, tunneling over open networks, authenticating with each other, and encrypting traffic. Indeed, there are not a few standards proposed for secure communication between smartcards. (The typical example is Modex's Value Transfer Protocol [13]) The uniqueness is that the security of TRN is designed to ensure the consistency of tokens distributed among the set of personal wallets. The atomicity control makes the basis of transfer more reliable. The traceability of the transfer, furthermore, enables the recovery of lost tokens and the detection of illegal tokens distributed on the public.
Ticket Wallet
The user must store an electronic token on a personal ticket wallet device. The tamper proof hardware is essential for protecting stored objects from unauthorized disclosure and modification. Its core is a secure integrated circuit computer, consists of multiple components -CPU, a cryptographic coprocessor, dynamic RAM and nonvolatile storage such as E2PROM and FeRAM and communication peripheralscombined with a single chip. The software that controls the transfer of token is installable on the chip.
Smartcard is one of the typical tamper resistance hardware, which embeds a secure chip in a plastic case [5] . However, the smartcard is not necessary suitable to store transferable tokens, because the plastic case gives no help to know the changing content of the card. The user will need some user interfaces to browse the content of token or send a token to another. We have therefore envisioned a smart phone-based ticket wallet. Using user interface and communication capability that the smart-phone supports, the user can easily exchange tokens. Figure 2 illustrates a portable phone, on which a secure chip is installed. Note that the TRN infrastructure should be designed as device-independent. In particular, inexpensive smartcards are useful for disposal ticket wallet devices. Accordingly, important is the compatibility with the smartcard technology that is limited in memory and processing resources. For example, the state of the art contact-less smartcard only supports an 8~16bit CPU, a 16~32K ROM for program module, 512bytes of RAM and 4~16K EEPROM for data storage. Although higher performance chips are under development, we should pay attention to its compactness.
Scope and Requirements
Tamper Resistance Network is a secure distribution environment, where a token can move from one wallet to another. In each wallet, a TRN driver will be installed, which authenticates a communicating entity, opens an encrypted session, and control the transfer of tokens. We premise that the TRN driver is certificated and protected from illegal disclosures and modifications, as well as a token object.
For the authentication and encryption, many techniques are now available on smartcard.
[5] In the section 3.2, we will present one of the authentication schemes that satisfy the TRN session. Over them, we will add two features: transaction control and movement trace. Here we define the "ACID" properties that the TRN driver should ensure. -Atomicity. The transfer of token is an all-or-nothing processing between two devices. The interruption must restart to complete the transferred or untransferred status (without any external coordinators).
-Consistency. The restart timing of the interrupted transfer is unpredictable, because the token is moved in suspicious circumstances. The token should neither be doubled nor eliminated from start to end transaction. -Isolation. A token owner must have the ability to retransfer the received token to another wallet as a new transaction.
-Durability. The wallet must record logging information to restart and synchronize the interrupted transaction. Ideally, the control of atomicity enables us to ensure the consistency of distributed tokens over the TRN environment. However, unexpected accidents and troubles might occur. The record of movements also helps detect such accidents and recover (or at least minimize) system troubles. We therefore need to trace moving tokens over the TRN.
Note that the TRN infrastructure proposed in this paper only discusses the scheme of transferring and tracing a data object. We will not specify any format of token, or the semantics of each token. Many applications today encode a ticket object using ASN. 1 BER TLV's (type-length-value) record.
[5] In addition, ISO7816-4 defines Application Protocol Data Unit to interact commands to access the record stored on smartcard. The TRN is defined only with the management of token movement, independent of a specific format and access method. 
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Tamper-Resistance Network
Tamper Resistance Network is a networked environment, where we can move electronic tokens from one tamper-proof device to another. To secure the movements on the TRN, we design the two protocol schemes, token atomicity and transfer traceabilitiy, over an authenticated session. Note that we premise that the TRN scheme designed in this section will work on a half duplex channel.
Overview
The TRN environment is comprised of several kinds of entities: a certification authority, ticketing agents, token objects and token devices. To start, we first define a small amount of preliminary notations. Let C be a finite set of ticketing agent Ci, D be a finite set of the devices D i , and O be a finite set of token object O i . Throughout the paper, we use the notation shown in Table 1 .
Entity A send a message to another entity The concatenation of messages m1 and m2 Message m encrypted using a cryptographic key k A pair of public and private keys of entity A. A digital certificate (signature) for message m by entity A A cryptographic digest of message m Figure 4 shows the confidential relationship of these entities over the TRN environment. The certification authority gives one's trust to all ticketing agents and token devices. Each entrusted ticketing agent creates token objects over certificate hierarchy. The token objects can be moved between entrusted devices.
Authenticated Session
To start, we will define the TRN session, where two devices communicate together through an authenticated and encrypted stream. Generally, we can generally use a challenge-response authentication or a shared secret key to authenticate trust of smartcard. Also, these techniques are regarded as enough secure over smartcards. [5] However, the important thing to trace moving tokens is to authenticate the identification of communicating entity, as well as trust of them. Accordingly, we introduce a PKI-based authentication [1] that can identify each device. Following shows that the device D A starts to authenticate D B .
Step1. The device DA initializes a session, and then sends the device identifier and its certificate to another device. 
Token Atomicity
If an electronic product were transferred as a simple monolithic object, the sender and the receiver will repeat ACK for ACK endlessly. Our approach begins with the extension of an object O i to an electronic transferable token.
Status of Moving token
The movement of token could be thought of a status transition between two devices. To represent the status of a moving token, we define the following two parameters, which adds to O i . 1. value parameter is a flag that determines whether the corresponding token is available, and whether the token is trustable. 2. from-to parameter is a record that represents where the corresponding token came from, or where the token will go to. Definition 6. A transferable token or a status of moving O i is denoted as a relation t of [oid i value i , from-to i ], where oid i is an identifier of O i , The value i , is an element of {enabled, disabled, trustless, trustless_disabled}, and from-to i is an element of the union set of {any, no} and D. 
Applied 2PC protocol
A two-phase commit (2PC) protocol is a basic scheme that synchronizes the status of transactions among multiple distributed systems. [3] We apply 2PC scheme to the status transition of t between two entities. Let M 2PC = {"copy", "copied", "commit", "committed", "true", "false"} be a set of protocol messages. Note that we already reported an atomic 2PC transfer scheme for an untraceable token [7] . This section extends the 2PC scheme to a traceable token. In short, it is possible to control whether we should trace the transfer or not, at Step4. If an untraceable token is committed, D B only have to set the complete ticket as t[oid i enabled, any]. For furthermore information, we will refer to our earlier work [7] .
Traceability
A relative problem with the transferability is the credibility of received tokens. Under environment where multiple venders can issue tickets, can you really trust an electronic ticket just entitled "Olympic Baseball Game"? Thus, the token O i just after received should be restricted as trustless. In order to use the trustless token (or move to another devices), the owner first has to check the authenticity represented by [oid i ] Cj . In this case, the verification of [oid i ] Cj requires the public-key of the creator C j , but a resource limited device cannot store public-keys of all agents on C. Thus, the ticket wallet has to retrieve the public-key for [oid i ] C j from the certification authority. Let M Auth = {"seekfor", "seeked") be a set of protocol messages. Due to resource constraints, we cannot record a chain of all movements on each token or device. However, this scheme can notify the certification authority of each movement of Oi , before the token owner uses or moves the token. The authority on the other hand can combine the notifications and complete the chain of all movements among devices.
Definition 7. A token movement is recorded as a tuple of [oidi idl , id k ], which means that the object Oi was moved from id l to idk .
DISCUSSION

ACID properties
In the transfer of a token object between particular two devices, the status of t is finite. Let the trustless status t[oid, trustless, id A ] on D B be regarded as the same as the complete ticket t[oid, trustless, id A ], because the process of ticket verification in Section 3.4 is independent of that of the transfer. Table 3 addresses all pairs of the statuses (I) ~ (IV), transferred between D A and D B . Figure 6 illustrates the status transition diagram in the transfer of O i . Here we will show a brief proof of the ACID properties in TRN. -Consistency. Whenever the transfer is interrupted, the status of t is determined as one of (II) ~ (V). At each status of (II) ~ (V), the value of t on D A and D B i s not simultaneously enabled. At the any status, the object Oi remains upon at least one device. Therefore, TRN never doubles the value nor lost the object completely. -Atomicity. In TRN, the sender plays a role in a transaction coordinator that resumes interrupted transactions. 
Traceability, Security, and Privacy
Here we will discuss how the traceability affects security, reliability, and privacy in the TRN infrastructure. -Detection. A remarkable advantage with the traceability is that it enables the certification authority to detect device disclosures. The certification authority always analyzes the flow of tokens, and if finding the branch that means that the illegally duplicated tokens are distributed, the authority can stop the flow and block suspicious devices. That is, the TRN infrastructure has the ability to keep the consistency (and the number) of distributed tokens on its running. -Recovery. An electronic token stored on the device might be broken by hardware longevity or natural disturbance such as radial ray and electromagnetic wave. (In order to enhance tamper resistance against a physical analysis, such breakdowns are also desirable) The tracing of the movement help detect the device, where a token will be lost for the last time. A ticketing agent will (if possible) reissue a lost token for the right owner. -Privacy. A unique identifier is assigned to each personal device, but it doesn't associate with a particular personal identification. If there is no map from device to person, privacy could be preserved. But this is ideally a hope. To bring it all down to earth, someone will make the mapping. In order for the users to control privacy matter, the TRN infrastructure should permit the use of disposable (or recyclable) devices, as the need arises.
. PROTOTYPED IMPLEMENTATION
In the JIPDEC 25 project, we experimented the transferability of electronic tickets over TRN. This section presents our initial implemented prototypes in the experimental project. 
Experimental Environments
The JIPDEC project assumes three ticket applications; (1) a user buying tickets online can receive electronic tickets directly from an Internet ticketing server to his or her personal ticket wallet; (2) the users also can freely exchange the tickets between ticket wallets; (3) ultimately, ticket examiners can check a ticket correctly at gating systems. Figure 7 shows the overview of experimental environment.
-Ticketing Server. We implemented the Internet ticketing service on a Servletbased web server. Here we regard the server as one of the token devices on D. Our implemented servlet can switch a HTTP/1.1 session to a TRN session with Switching-Protocol ("Protocol-Upgrade: TRN").
-Ticket Wallet. Initially, we developed a personal ticket wallet on the small Java TM device, named PFU BossaNova [9] . Although BossaNova has no proper tamper resistances for its memory, it supports GUI-based touch panel and IrDA communication. After the initial implementation, we developed more secure
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wallet using a tamper proof security box that supports elliptic curve cryptographic engine and ISO14443 based communication capability. (This security box is originally developed as an emulation test-bed of contact-less smartcard.) Both types of wallet can connect to a PC through a R/W unit. -Ticket browser. The token devices are by nature passive. To browse and operate a personal wallet device, we used a PC as a user interface. For example, when you want to buy a ticket, you first connect the server with a HTTP request, and then turn to the TRN mode. At the same time, you start polling your wallet on the end of R/W unit. After that, the PC exchange authentication and succeeding encrypted tokens over TRN. From viewpoints of TRN, the server and the wallet never trust mediated PC.
More than 100 persons tested to use our prototype system for purchasing tickets, exchanging them, and checking their entrance to the stadium electronically. The size of messages to transfer n byte-length token is estimated as follows: sent size (copy and commit) is about n + 40 bytes; received size (copied and committed) is 48 bytes. Moreover, the required size of logging field in each transfer is value (1 byte) and from-to (4 bytes) with a token object itself. The logging size is small enough to implement the TRN broker on the limited recourses.
CONCLUSION
The electronic transferability of tokens is a double-edged sword for organizations that conduct electronic business on the Internet. The main contribution of Tamper Resistance Network (TRN) is to provide us with a secure distribution environment that allows us to move tokens electronically without risk of duplicating or destroying them. The control of atomicity and the trace of movement are provided to enhance the security of trading between smartcards or other tamper-proof device.
This paper addressed the experimental prototype for the distribution of electronic tickets on TRN. The finding of the experimentation is that the TRN framework is useful to setup online business selling electronic tickets through the Web. Future directions we will investigate include additional security evaluation, fair-exchange, and PKI design based on business models.
